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This paper introduces the new Family of Ethnic Power Relations (EPR) Datasets, version 2014,
which is the latest in a series of datasets on ethnicity that have stimulated civil war research in
the past decade. The EPR Family provides data on ethnic groups’ access to state power, their
settlement patterns, links to rebel organizations, trans-border ethnic kin relations, and intra-
ethnic cleavages. The new 2014 version does not only extend the dataset’s temporal coverage
from 2009 to 2013, but it also offers several new features, such as a new measure of regional
autonomy that is independent of national-level executive power and a new dataset component
coding intra-ethnic identities and cleavages. Moreover, for the first time, detailed documentation
of the EPR data is provided through the EPR Atlas. The paper presents these novelties in detail
and compares the EPR Family 2014 to the most relevant alternative datasets on ethnicity.
1
Introduction
The past decade has seen a surge in academic studies of ethnic civil conflicts, supported by 
significant efforts in data collection. Focusing on one of these new data sources, this article 
presents the Family of Ethnic Power Relations (EPR) Datasets, version 2014, which offers 
scholars a set of unique instruments to deepen their knowledge about ethnic conflict. The EPR 
Dataset Family consists of five distinct components built around the EPR Core dataset, which 
provides annual data on politically relevant ethnic groups and their access to state power from 
1946 to 2013. The Core dataset is complemented by geo-spatial information on ethnic groups’ 
settlement patterns, data on ethnic groups’ links to rebel organizations, on the trans-border 
relations of ethnic groups, and on intra-ethnic cleavages.
The EPR Family 2014 offers several new features. In addition to extending the coverage to 2013,
it introduces a new, two-level notion of state power that explicitly distinguishes between access 
to power at the level of the central state and political power at the regional level. Moreover, it 
presents new structural data on ethnic groups’ intra-ethnic cleavages. Finally, for the first time, 
detailed documentation of the data is provided through the EPR Atlas, available from the 
Geographic Research On War, Unified Platform (GROWup).1
The purpose of this paper is to present these novelties and to outline the structure and 
functionality of the entire dataset family. After briefly reviewing existing data on ethnic groups, 
we introduce the newly added members of the EPR Family 2014 in detail, and explain how 
researchers can access these data through GROWup. We then compare the EPR Family to the 
most relevant alternative datasets on politicized ethnicity, in terms of both coverage and included
variables, before ending with concluding thoughts on future data collection efforts.
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Previous Datasets on Ethnicity
The concept of ethnicity first found its way into quantitative research in economics, notably in 
studies of corruption (e.g. Mauro 1995) and economic growth (e.g. Easterly and Levine 1997). 
Subsequently, scholars turned their attention to the relationship between ethnic diversity and civil
war onset (Collier and Hoeffler 2002, 2004; Fearon and Laitin 2003; Sambanis 2001). These 
studies all rely on an ethno-linguistic fractionalization (ELF) index derived from the Soviet Atlas
Narodov Mira (USSR 1964), which focuses on linguistic differences. Hence, they conceptualize 
ethnicity as a purely demographic concept, measured as the time-invariant degree of linguistic 
heterogeneity of country populations.
While some fractionalization measures explicitly take into account other sources of ethnic 
diversity, such as religious or racial differences (e.g. Alesina et al. 2003; Fearon 2003; Vanhanen 
1999), they are associated with important limitations. For one thing, these indices disregard the 
political relevance of ethnic groups (Chandra and Wilkinson 2008; Posner 2004). Moreover, they
say nothing about the political power relations between groups as such individualistic 
conceptualizations of ethnicity ignore the crucial role of the state in shaping groups’ access to 
political power and material resources (Cederman and Girardin 2007).
Adopting an alternative approach, Gurr et al. (1993) collected data on discrimination against 
ethnic minorities, their grievances, levels of political mobilization, and rebellious activities (see 
also Gurr 2000). Their Minorities at Risk (MAR) dataset broke new ground as regards the 
political relevance of ethnic groups and soon became the standard source for studies of ethnic 
mobilization, protest, and ethnic group rebellion (see, e.g., Birnir 2007; Gurr and Moore 1997; 
Ishiyama 2009; Olzak 2006; Walter 2006).
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However, the MAR dataset’s focus on minorities “at risk” limits its applicability. Although 
featuring some “advantaged” minorities, this dataset remains incomplete since it does not include
majority groups, some of which may be at risk of being challenged by disadvantaged minorities 
or are indeed discriminated against themselves in regimes of ethnic minority rule. Furthermore, 
the data do not include politically relevant minority groups that are not considered “at risk.” For 
inferential analyses, this particular sample composition is unproblematic as long as the outcome 
of interest is unrelated to the mechanism of group selection applied in MAR, but may lead to 
biased results otherwise (Hug 2013).2
Inspired by the pioneering approach of the MAR dataset, the Ethnic Power Relations (EPR) 
dataset provides a more comprehensive selection of politically relevant ethnic groups, including 
minority and majority, and discriminated as well as state-controlling groups. EPR version 1.1 
was introduced by scholars from ETH Zurich and the University of California in Los Angeles 
(UCLA) on the basis of an online expert survey (Cederman, Wimmer, and Min 2010). The EPR 
dataset defines ethnicity as a subjectively experienced sense of commonality based on a belief in 
common ancestry and shared culture (Weber 1976). Different markers may be used to indicate 
such shared ancestry and culture, such as a common language, similar phenotypical features, or 
adherence to the same faith. An ethnic group is considered politically relevant if at least one 
political organization has claimed to represent its interests at the national level or if its members 
are subjected to state-led political discrimination (Cederman, Wimmer, and Min 2010, 99). 
Drawing on the EPR data, several recent studies have generated new empirical evidence on the 
role of ethnicity in civil wars (see e.g. Asal et al. forthcoming; Cederman, Weidmann, and 
Gleditsch 2011; Cederman, Wimmer, and Min 2010; Fjelde and Hultman 2013; Roessler 2011).
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The EPR Dataset Family 2014
This section outlines the structure of the latest EPR version, the EPR Dataset Family 2014, and 
presents its main novelties. The term “dataset family” emphasizes the fact that since its original 
release EPR has grown into a comprehensive system of tightly integrated datasets. By referring 
to the year of release, it also leaves behind the old versioning system that focused on the 
individual dataset components, and gives a more precise indication of the data’s temporal reach.
The 2014 version builds directly on EPR-ETH version 2.0.3 It offers several new features:
 The temporal scope is extended by four years from 2009 to 2013.4
 Regional autonomy is now coded for all groups regardless of whether they are included 
or excluded at the national level. 
 The EPR Atlas offers detailed documentation of the data, including graphic presentation 
and explanations of the main coding decisions as well as references to the sources.
 The EPR-Ethnic Dimensions (EPR-ED) component dataset identifies linguistic, religious,
and racial segments of all ethnic groups included in EPR.
 The “Trans-border Ethnic Kin” (EPR-TEK) data is fully integrated in the dataset 
structure.
Figure 1 shows the organization of the EPR Family resulting from these new features.
[Figure 1]
At the country level, the EPR Family 2014 includes all states with a population, in 1990, of at 
least 500,000, and in which ethnicity has been politically relevant.5 For all these states, the EPR 
Core dataset identifies the politically relevant ethnic groups and codes their access to state 
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power. GeoEPR provides geo-spatial information on the settlement patterns of these groups.6 
Furthermore, the ACD2EPR component links the EPR groups to the rebel organizations in 
UCDP’s actor database, while the EPR-TEK dataset identifies trans-border ethnic connections 
between EPR groups in different countries. Finally, at the sub-group level, the EPR-ED dataset 
codes linguistic, religious, and racial segments of the EPR groups.
The data of all components of the EPR Family 2014 were collected by regional experts and 
research assistants. Each coding was then evaluated by the EPR Management Committee and in 
region-specific workshops regarding its consistency with the globally applied coding rules. In 
some cases of disagreements, we consulted additional country experts.7 The following sections 
will present the EPR Core dataset and those individual components that were newly added to the 
data universe during the recent update process before explaining how the data can be accessed 
through the online platform GROWup.
The EPR Core Dataset 2014
The Core dataset of the EPR Family 2014 provides annual data on politically relevant ethnic 
groups, their relative sizes as a share of the total population, and their access to state power. 
Power access is measured with an ordinal scale composed of three main categories, depending 
on whether a group (1) controls power alone, (2) shares power with other ethnic groups, or (3) is 
excluded from executive state power. Each of these three main categories is divided into several 
sub-categories:
1. The group rules alone: monopoly or dominant. In contrast to monopoly power, the status
of dominant indicates “token” representation of other ethnic groups in the executive.
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2. The group shares power: senior partner or junior partner, depending on the group’s 
absolute influence in the executive (i.e. irrespective of group size).
3. The group is excluded: powerless, discriminated, or self-exclusion. While powerless 
means that the group is simply not represented (or does not have influence) in the 
executive, discrimination indicates an active, intentional, and targeted discrimination by 
the state against group members in the domain of public politics. The special category of 
self-exclusion applies to groups that have excluded themselves from central state power, 
in the sense that they control a particular territory of the state which they have declared 
independent from the central government.8
Groups falling into one of the first two main categories can be regarded as politically included in 
distinction to the excluded groups in the third main category. The new version identifies a total of
819 ethnic groups that were politically relevant at one point or the other during the time period 
from 1946 to 2013.
In addition to the national power variable, the updated EPR Core Dataset measures access to 
executive power at the regional level with a separate regional autonomy variable. In previous 
versions of EPR, regional autonomy status was coded as a subcategory of exclusion at the 
national level. However, this coding scheme does not allow identifying those groups that are 
both included at the national level and enjoy regional autonomy. To solve this problem, the 
current version disentangles the regional level of political power from power access to the state’s
executive. Groups that only have access to power at the sub-state level are coded as “powerless” 
at the national level. Included groups in a power-sharing regime (that is, those coded as “senior 
partner” or “junior partner”) may or may not simultaneously enjoy regional autonomy.9
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For a group to be coded as regionally autonomous, two conditions must be jointly satisfied. First,
there must be a meaningful10 and active regional executive organ that operates below the state 
level (for example, the departmental, provincial, or district level) but above the local 
administrative level, and group representatives must exert actual influence on the decisions of 
this entity, acting in line with the group’s local interests.
The second condition also implies that a given regional entity must have de facto (as opposed to 
mere de jure) political power. Federal states, such as Switzerland or India, are the most typical 
(but not the only) such systems of regional autonomy. The Kurdistan Regional Government in 
northern Iraq is another example of meaningful political power at the sub-state level (Katzman 
2010). In contrast, the regional administrative subdivisions in many Central and Eastern 
European countries do not possess any political or fiscal powers and thus cannot be considered 
meaningful political decision-making bodies. Furthermore, non-territorial forms of autonomy 
(such as the recently established minority councils in Serbia) do not fall under this definition of 
regional autonomy.11
Table 2 compares the relative frequency of regional autonomy between excluded and power-
sharing groups. It shows that autonomy is more frequent among excluded groups. This suggests 
that ethnic power sharing typically happens along one dimension alone: either in the form of a 
“grand coalition” (Lijphart 1977) at the national level or in some sort of territorial power sharing.
Nevertheless, the table also shows that a sizable number of autonomous groups were not 
captured by the former coding scheme, underlining the importance of this change in the data 
structure of the new EPR version.
[Table 1]
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Identifying Trans-border Ethnic Kin Relations: EPR-TEK 2014
While previously separate from the rest of the EPR data, the Trans-border Ethnic Kin (EPR-
TEK) dataset has been fully integrated in the new EPR Family 2014 in the context of the update 
process. EPR-TEK identifies all EPR groups with settlements in at least two countries through 
nominal matching. Thus, groups in different countries are coded as trans-border kin if they share 
the same ethnographic name, including synonyms. The Kurds who live in Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and 
Syria are a typical example of such a transnational ethnic group (see Figure 2).
[Figure 2]
Overall, EPR-TEK identifies 149 unique TEK groups. Out of the 819 EPR groups, 418 have at 
least one TEK connection to another country. Many TEK groups are spread across a multitude of
states, such as the Arabs or Russians. Moreover, only in fifteen countries worldwide, EPR groups
lack any cross-border links to ethnic groups in other countries. This attests to the relevance of 
trans-border ethnic links and of the EPR-TEK dataset itself, which allows researchers to account 
for this transnational dimension in their analyses of ethnic conflict.
Coding Intra-ethnic Identities and Cleavages: EPR-ED 2014
The most recent addition to the EPR Dataset Family is the Ethnic Dimensions (EPR-ED) data, 
which identify the linguistic, religious, and racial segments of all EPR groups.12 This is the first 
dataset that codes both multiple cleavage dimensions and several segments within a cleavage 
9
dimension for ethnic groups. For each group a maximum of three linguistic and religious 
segments are reported, along with their relative sizes (as a share of the total group population). In
the case of race, the segments indicate miscegenation by denoting up to three different racial 
origins of a given ethnic group.
Figure 3 illustrates the basic setup of the EPR-ED data with two ethnic groups from Nigeria: the 
Hausa-Fulani from the northern part of the country and the Yoruba from the southwest. The 
Hausa are a religiously homogeneous but linguistically divided group, while the Yoruba are 
united by their language, yet religiously divided between Christians and Muslims. The largest 
religious segment of the Yoruba is made up by Sunni Muslims from the Maliki background, the 
same religion practiced by the Hausa group. Thus, on the religious dimension there is a 
substantial minority among the Yoruba that shares a trait with the Hausa. On the racial 
dimension, EPR-ED does not differentiate the two groups as they both originate from Sub-
Saharan Africa.
[Figure 3]
Overall, the dataset identifies 635 unique language segments in the Ethnologue database (Lewis 
2009) that are spoken by the 819 EPR groups. Relying on the Joshua Project (2011), EPR-ED 
codes 71 distinct religious creeds that ethnic groups adhere to. Finally, the data distinguish 
between eight different regional origins that have become relevant as social categories through 
European colonization of the world.
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Accessing the EPR Dataset Family
All individual components of the EPR Dataset Family 2014 can be downloaded from the 
GROWup web portal at http://growup.ethz.ch. GROWup provides a user-friendly Research Front-
End (RFE), which allows users to assemble and download customized panel datasets composed 
of EPR-related variables. The data offered via the RFE are pre-aggregated to the level of group-
years and country-years. Formatted in order to facilitate statistical analysis, the selection of 
variables includes conflict onset and incidence dummies, as well as various peace-years variables
and other temporally defined conflict indicators.13
Comparison with Other Datasets on Politicized Ethnicity
This section compares the EPR Family 2014 to three alternative datasets on ethnicity and 
discusses the potential limitations of the EPR data in empirical applications. Table 1 lists the 
main characteristics of the EPR Family, the MAR Project, two samples of the A-MAR dataset, 
and Fearon’s (2003) list of ethnic groups.14
Table 1: The EPR Family 2014 and Its Alternatives. Comparison of Coverage and Variables
EPR Family 
2014
Minorities at 
Risk (MAR)
A-MAR 
group list
A-MAR sub-sample Fearon (2003)
Sample
Inclusion criteria Discrimination 
or political 
representation
Discrimination or 
mobilization
Social 
relevance
Stratified, representative 
sample of new groups 
included in A-MAR
Countries’ 
main ethnic 
groups
N groups 819 342a) 1157 74 822
N countries 141 (165)b) 123a) 169 55 160
Time horizon 1946-2013 1940-2006c) - ??? -
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Variables
Group size Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Spatial extension Yes Nod) No No No
Violent conflict Yes Yes - Yes -
Political power Yes Yes - Yes -
Economic inequality Yese) Yes - Yes -
Cultural rights No Yes - Yes -
Non-violent 
mobilization
No Yes
(group 
organization and 
protest)
- Yes
(group organization and 
protest)
-
Trans-border ethnic 
links 
Yes Nof) - Nof) -
Intra-ethnic cleavages Yes Nog) - Nog) -
Documentation of 
codings
Yes Yes - ??? -
Notes: a) In the 2004-2006 data of MAR, these numbers dropped to 284 groups in 117 countries.
b) 141 groups in countries where EPR considers ethnicity to be politically relevant. Where this is not the case, EPR lists one 
national group as placeholder, which increases the total number of included groups to 165. These national groups are relevant for 
the coding of trans-border ethnic links in the EPR-TEK data.
c) Until 1985, the MAR variables are only coded in 5-year intervals, and some of the variables are not coded over the full time 
period.
d) The MAR dataset contains categorical and ordinal variables on groups’ settlement patterns, such as their spatial distribution.
e) Cederman, Weidmann, and Gleditsch (2011) have derived estimates of horizontal economic inequality, by combining ethnic 
groups’ settlement patterns from the GeoEPR dataset and geo-referenced income data by Nordhaus (2006).
f) While the MAR data code whether ethnic groups have transnational links (and whether kin groups hold political power in their 
countries), they do not identify these kin groups.
g) The MAR data provide measures of group distinctiveness to the country’s majority group, but they do not identify the different
linguistic, religious, and racial segments of each group.
As a result of their different inclusion criteria, these datasets cover quite different and differently 
sized samples of ethnic groups. Yet, all of these data sources rely on ethnic groups as their units 
of analysis, which makes them subject to the criticism of reifying and attributing power of 
agency to mere social categories (see Brubaker 2004).15 Although ethnic identities may change 
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over time, there is usually sufficient group cohesion for ethnic groups to be considered stable 
identity categories within the time spans of conflict processes (Cederman, Gleditsch, and Buhaug
2013, 23). Nevertheless, because ethnic groups are treated as monolithic, none of these datasets 
is able to reveal potentially competing agendas and claims of different organizational 
representatives of the same group.16
In terms of temporal coverage, the EPR Family 2014 offers the most up-to-date codings of ethnic
groups and their social and political characteristics, ranging up to 2013. The original MAR 
dataset has a similar temporal coverage although until 1985, the variables are only coded in 5-
year intervals, and some of the variables are not coded over the full time period. In contrast, 
Fearon’s data and the new A-MAR group are time-invariant.
There are also considerable differences between these datasets with regard to the variables 
included, as Table 1 reveals. Compared to the original MAR dataset, the EPR Family 2014 offers
less information on group characteristics, such as their level and strategies of political 
mobilization, but includes a much more extensive sample of ethnic groups. Moreover, the 
GeoEPR dataset provides geocoded maps of the settlement areas of all EPR groups, while the 
EPR-TEK and EPR-ED extensions offer additional information on groups’ trans-border links and
intra-ethnic divisions that is not available in MAR. Although many classes of variables are found
in both datasets, there are important differences in the type of measures employed to capture 
similar theoretical concepts. For example, in terms of groups’ political status MAR relies on a 
political discrimination index, whereas EPR measures groups’ access to state power over time 
using an ordinal classification of power status. With respect to the ethnic conflict coding EPR 
offers onset and incidence variables whereas MAR uses an ordinal index of the level of group 
rebellion.17 On balance, the two datasets have distinct strengths and weaknesses as regards the 
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variables they include. Yet, the EPR Family 2014 offers a more extensive geographic and 
temporal coverage than MAR. In addition, it has the advantage of providing researchers with 
geocoded data. 
It should be noted that although including a much larger sample of ethnic groups than the 
original MAR dataset, the EPR Family 2014 still only codes a subset of all ethnic identities. The 
selection criterion of political relevance ensures that groups included in EPR can reasonably be 
assumed to possess a minimal level of political agency. However, the pre-selection of relevant 
groups is associated with two potential shortcomings for empirical applications. First, the data 
are not well suited for the analysis of ethnic mobilization processes, since the sample does not 
include ethnic identities that are not (yet) politically relevant. Second, empirical analyses 
employing EPR-coded ethnic groups as units of analysis may be subject to selection bias
(Heckman 1979). This is the case if unmeasured variables exist affecting both the studied group-
level outcome and the probability of a given ethnic group of being coded as politically relevant. 
However, the issue of selection bias depends on the particular research question at hand and 
cannot be determined a priori (Hug 2013). In particular, group-level analyses that focus on 
outcomes unrelated to the employed selection criteria are unlikely to be biased (Hug 2013, 199-
201). Moreover, selection bias can also be addressed by replicating group-level studies using 
different units of analysis (for example, countries or geographically defined sub-national units) 
onto which the EPR data can be mapped, but which themselves are not subject to selection.
The new A-MAR data were collected in response to these concerns. As Table 1 shows, A-MAR 
comprises an even larger sample of ethnic groups than the EPR Dataset Family. Yet, at the 
current state it consists only of a list of socially relevant ethnic groups of each country, lacking 
any information on groups’ social and political characteristics. So far the A-MAR authors have 
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coded the full range of MAR variables for a stratified but representative sample of 74 new ethnic
groups that were not previously included in MAR and, thus, not selected according to the 
political relevance criterion. These groups can be matched with the original MAR groups to 
arrive at a new, theoretically unbiased sample of ethnic groups (Birnir et al. 2012, 15-7). 
Although still limited to the group list, the new A-MAR data constitute an important instrument 
to examine potential selection biases in quantitative studies of ethnic conflict. Nevertheless, at 
the current stage, the variables relevant to conflict researchers are only coded for a relatively 
small sample of groups, which for many empirical applications may not be sufficient. In contrast,
the EPR Dataset Family offers full (including geo-spatial) information for all groups included.18
Finally, while Fearon’s data encompass a slightly higher number of countries and ethnic groups, 
they possess two crucial disadvantages vis-à-vis the EPR Dataset Family besides their time-
invariance. First, they do not provide any information on groups’ social and political 
characteristics beyond demographic size and, second, they are limited no non-spatial 
representations.
Conclusion and Outlook
The EPR Dataset Family 2014 provides conflict researchers with new instruments to improve 
their understanding of ethnic conflict processes. Thanks to its extensive scope, this system of 
datasets facilitates the study of multiple causes of ethnic conflict. However, much work still 
remains to be done with regard to the quality of quantitative data on ethnic politics. In this 
regard, there are three promising directions of future data collection. First, it would be useful to 
identify the actual political actors that are at the roots of the collective action undertaken by 
ethnic groups. For this purpose, we plan to launch a new data collection project, the EPR-
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Organizations Dataset, which will offer information on ethnically based political organizations in
all countries of the world. The goal is to break up the monolithic concept of ethnic groups by 
taking into account the diverse agendas and claims of different organizational representatives, 
and to study ethnic mobilization processes.
Second, broadening the spectrum of political violence covered by EPR beyond civil war, 
upcoming extensions of the ACD2EPR dataset will link EPR groups to all UCDP actors, 
including those involved in one-sided violence, non-state conflict, and interstate war. Finally, 
going beyond the nominal coding of EPR-TEK, future versions of the dataset will adhere to a 
claim-based coding that allows for changes in transnational ethnic identifications. 
While these and similar projects promise significant improvements in the quality of data on 
politicized ethnicity, for the time being the EPR Datasets Family enables researchers to study 
complex research problems related to politicized ethnicity and political violence within a 
consistent data structure. Future updates will ensure that the data remain relevant to conflict 
analysis for years to come.
16
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(21%)
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Total 24,589
(75%)
7,992
(25%)
32,581
(100%)
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percentages. The unit of analysis is the group year.
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Figure 1: The structure of the EPR Dataset Family 2014
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Figure 2: Majority settlement areas of the Kurds
Note: Based on maps from GeoEPR 2014.
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Figure 3: Ethnic identities of two Nigerian groups
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1 See http://growup.ethz.ch/. For a detailed overview of GROWup, see Cederman, Girardin, and 
Wucherpfennig (2014).
2 In response to these concerns, the MAR research team recently presented a new dataset of ethnic 
groups, labeled A-MAR (“All Minorities at Risk”), that introduces a comprehensive list of “socially
relevant” ethnic identities by relying on a mainly “cultural” definition of (potentially) relevant 
ethnic groups (Birnir et al. 2015). We will discuss this dataset in more detail below.
3 The EPR-ETH version 2.0 was compiled by a team at ETH Zurich, extending the coverage of the 
original data from 2005 to 2009 and thoroughly revising the codings for various countries. 
Subsequently, a team of researchers at UCLA recently assembled their own version of the dataset 
(labeled EPR version 3) that builds directly on version 1.1 and extends it to 2010. However, because
it is currently limited to non-spatial data and incompatible with the other EPR-related datasets, this 
version was not taken into account in the composition of the new EPR Family 2014.
4 Thanks to the lower population threshold for case selection introduced in EPR-ETH 2.0, the EPR 
Family 2014 also extends the geographic coverage of the original EPR data. The following 
countries were added to the dataset: Bahrain, Bhutan, Cyprus, Djibouti, Fiji, Guyana, Mauritius, and
Singapore.
5 Note that the EPR Family 2014 draws on Gleditsch and Ward (1999) for its list of sovereign 
states.
6 In addition to extending the coverage to 2013, the new GeoEPR version now distinguishes 
between ”statewide” groups that constitute a majority throughout the entire territory of a state and 
“dispersed” groups: minority groups whose members are scattered throughout different regions of a 
state, such as the Jews in Poland. Previously, these groups were both combined in the same category
of “dispersed” groups.
7 In the case of the ACD2EPR data, we are also grateful for excellent assistance from the UCDP 
team at Uppsala University.
8 Note that this category was labeled “separatist autonomy” in previous EPR versions.
9 Note that the autonomy dimension is not coded for “monopoly” and “dominant” groups since 
their political interests are assumed to be sufficiently represented at the level of the central state.
10 The term “meaningful” here refers to executive organs that carry out core competencies of the 
state, involving, for example, cultural rights (language and education) and/or significant economic 
autonomy (e.g. the right to levy taxes, or very substantial spending autonomy).
11 See Cederman et al. (forthcoming) for more information on the regional autonomy coding.
12 Instead of resorting to assumptions about differences in the physical appearance of individual 
ethnic group members, the EPR-ED dataset defines race as ethnic groups’ origins from particular 
world regions, such as Europe, Sub-Saharan Africa, Oceania, etc. These regional origins – 
expressed at the individual level through certain phenotypical markers (particularly skin color) – 
have become relevant as social categories in the context of European colonization of the world and 
the related process of racial classification (see e.g. Wade 2010, 5-19).
13 Since EPR takes into account shifts in the relevant ethnic cleavages, ethnic groups may split into 
different, politically relevant sub-groups or, reversely, lower-level ethnic categories may become 
politically relevant as parts of an overarching umbrella category. This means that the construction of
“historical” variables for EPR groups, such as the number of ethnic conflicts a group has 
experienced, is not trivial. Yet, the data available to researchers through GROWup provide variables 
that keep track of a group’s history even across changes in group hierarchy. For instance, they 
include a variable indicating the number of conflict onsets a group or any of its (potential) ancestors
has ever experienced.
14 Since the sub-sample of groups, for which A-MAR provides variable codings, is currently not 
yet publicly available, the information in Table 1 is based on Birnir et al. (2012).
15 Note that the Minorities at Risk Organizational Behavior (MAROB) dataset, a subsidiary of the 
MAR Project, uses ethno-political organizations as units of analysis (Asal, Pate, and Wilkenfeld 
2008). However, at the current stage it is limited to 26 countries of the Middle East and North 
Africa.
16 Note, however, that this is not true for conflict periods since the ACD2EPR dataset identifies 
multiple rebel organizations fighting for the same ethnic group (Cederman, Gleditsch, and Buhaug 
2013, ch. 8; Wucherpfennig et al. 2012).
17 In addition, the MAR dataset includes variables on intercommunal conflict and government 
repression.
18 Note also that using the new A-MAR data, Birnir et al. (2012) replicated the main results of 
Cederman, Wimmer and Min (2010), providing evidence against selection bias in the EPR data.
